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1962/11/15

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DRAFTED BY A. AKOLOVSKIY - 11/16/62

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

R
Date: Nov. 15, 1962
Time: 6-9:20 PM
Place: Soviet Mission,
New York

PARTICIPANTS: US - Ambassador Stevenson
Ambassador Yost

Mr. Pedersen
Mr. Akolovsky

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, A/CDC/MB

USSR -

Mr. Kuznetsov
Mr. Zorin
Mr. Mandalevich
Mr. Zharetskov

REVIEWED BY [Signature] DATE 3/2/68
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CUBA

Reviewed by: Elijah Kell Jr.

Date: 2/12/92 19__

Amb. Stevenson noted that this meeting was timely and that he was glad that Mr. Kuznetsov had arranged for it. The reason for this was that he had just come from U Thant who had told him about a letter from Castro in which Castro was threatening to shoot down our reconnaissance planes because of violation of Cuban air space. He stressed that this was a very serious matter, and when this became public tomorrow the consequences, at least publicly, would be predictable.

Amb. Stevenson stressed that in view of the fact that the USSR had been unable to perform with the respect to UN observation and supervision over completion of the agreement, the Cuban threat was tantamount to the threat of force against the only means the US had of observing compliance with the agreement. In these circumstances, while the Cuban letter had not yet been discussed with Washington, he felt that the Cuban protest would be met by

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another protest. He hoped that this would be the end of it; otherwise the consequences with respect to what might happen would not be our responsibility.

Mr. Kuznetsov said that with regard to US flights over Cuban territory ^{he} ~~it~~ could hardly add anything to what he had said at the last meeting. He could only reaffirm the Soviet view that those flights were illegal, a violation of the UN Charter, and a gross interference in the internal affairs of Cuba. There was no justification for such flights. One could not motivate these flights by saying that the USSR had not performed with regard to on-site inspection, because the USSR was not going back on its obligations and had given ~~us~~ the US ^{the} ~~an~~ opportunity to check the fulfillment of its obligations. He believed that this procedure of verifying ships carrying missiles had been discussed at length between the two sides, and that this operation had been carried out satisfactorily. The USSR had been cooperative and the US had also shown an understanding attitude in that situation.

Mr. Kuznetsov continued that from Amb. Stevenson's statement he drew a different conclusion, namely, that time had come to accelerate the settlement of the whole Cuban problem. He said he had asked Amb. Stevenson to come to this meeting because he wished to express some views in connection with the Soviet-Cuban joint draft protocol, which had been given to U Thant for transmission to the US. The protocol had been prepared to speed up the settlement and to secure a long term solution of the problem. The USSR believed that the negotiations on a settlement of the Cuban crisis must now enter a new, decisive stage. Of course, there remained some questions which were still unsettled and over which the two sides differed, but these steps already taken ~~independently~~ in the direction of settling the crisis ~~must~~ provided

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provided sufficient basis for developing and presenting to the UN a document containing a final solution of the problem and including all the obligations of all the parties concerned. When the USSR referred to the steps already taken, it had in mind primarily the steps taken by the USSR in connection with the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba. As had already been mentioned, ~~in~~ ^{now} within the context of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement the USSR had undertaken to stop the work on ~~MRK~~ sites and to dismantle those systems. As was clearly evident from the President's October 27 letter, all other steps were to be taken only after a long term settlement of the Cuban crisis had been arrived at and after verification by the UN of the obligations of all parties had been arranged. However, to create a better atmosphere for further negotiations and to demonstrate to all states, and the US in particular, that it was honestly carrying out its obligations, the USSR had agreed to withdraw ^{final} missiles even before agreement on ~~an~~ a settlement of the Cuban crisis had been reached.

Mr. Kuznetsov believed that this was the first time ^{the} ~~in~~ history of modern international relations ^{that} ~~when~~ a great power had fulfilled its obligations considerably earlier than had been agreed upon previously. On the other hand, the President's October 27 letter contained assurances with regard to the willingness of the ~~US~~, after a settlement through the UN, to lift immediately the ~~quarantine and to~~ give assurances against invasion of Cuba, as well as ^{the} a statement of the President's confidence that/other countries of the Western Hemisphere would do likewise. The President's confidence in this respect was, in the view of the USSR, the very basis on which, after the necessary formalization, the Caribbean situation could be normalized. Thus, the USSR

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believed that now there existed all the necessary conditions for a final and lasting settlement of the Cuban crisis. But one side's willingness to reach such settlement was not sufficient; willingness on the part of both sides was required. The USSR believed that it was necessary to consider the entire problem as a whole and not to take out artificially individual questions or to advance such matters as were unrelated to the problem itself, matters which could only complicate the situation and delay a settlement. The USSR believed that it was now possible to proceed with the preparation of such a settlement. Such a settlement would help in removing the unnecessary things which only hindered the solution of the problem and made it difficult to agree on a long term settlement of the Cuban situation. To start such a preparation, it was necessary to turn from discussion of the problem in general to the discussion of a document embracing the whole ^{range} ~~subject~~ of questions relating to a final settlement of the Cuban problem.

Mr. Kuznetsov continued that as far as the Soviet Union understood, the US ^{was} ~~was~~ also not opposed to the possibility of putting this final settlement in a document to be subscribed to the UN. This conclusion could be drawn from Mr. Stevenson's remarks in the course of earlier discussions to the effect that the positions of the two sides on a final settlement were close in spirit and that the US was prepared to make a statement in the Security Council. In the course of previous discussions, the US had expressed the desire of having the USSR present his views in a document. The Soviet and the Cuban Governments had jointly prepared a document and submitted it to U Thant with the request that it be transmitted to the US. Mr. Kuznetsov said he also wished to give a copy of the document to Mr. Stevenson now.

After handing the paper to Amb. Stevenson, Mr. Kuznetsov said he wished to make some clarifications so as to enable the US to understand the Soviet position better. He said the USSR believed that since three parties were involved in this problem, the best form of a document was a protocol containing the obligations of the three governments, to be signed by those three governments and approved by the Security Council. In accordance with the Khrushchev - Kennedy correspondence, and also taking into account the statement of Fidel Castro, the draft protocol should include and in fact included the following obligations:

On the part of the US: (1) Discontinuance of all measures related to the so-called quarantine; (2) Withdrawal of troops concentrated in the southeast of the US; (3) Non-intervention in Cuba and prevention of intervention by others; (4) Respect for the sovereignty of Cuba and non-interference in Cuba's internal affairs; (5) Cessation of subversive ~~subversive~~ activities against Cuba; (6) Non-interference with the free exercise by Cuba of its trade and economic relations with others; Entry (7) ~~Transition~~ into negotiations with Cuba on ~~Quarantine~~.

On the part of the USSR: (1) Reaffirmation of the fact that it had withdrawn from Cuba those types of weapons on which agreement had been reached, and that the US

On the part of Cuba: (1) Agreement to the dismantling and the withdrawal of the weapons mentioned above; (2) Reaffirmation of the fact that the basis of Cuba's policy is to adhere to the principles of the United Nation including the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

Mr. Shostakov said that as to what should be verified within the framework of the final agreement, the USSR believed that first of all assurance must be created for Cuba that neither the US nor any other country intended to commit aggressive acts ^{subversive} ~~aggression~~ and that no ~~unsubstantiated~~ activities were being carried on against Cuba. It was hardly necessary to stress that this requirement was dictated by the entire past experience of US-Cuban relations, which

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convincingly showed the existence of aggressive intentions on the part of the US against this small republic. From U Thant's suggestion, it followed that the verification system should cover parts of US territory as well as other countries in the Western Hemisphere. ~~Nevertheless~~ For its part, the Cuban Government supported in principle U Thant's suggestion for the creation of a UN presence in the Caribbean. Since the US Government said that it had apprehensions with respect to the possibility of an attack by Cuba - although ^{said} it must be ~~known~~ that such statements on the part of such a powerful country did not sound serious - the Cuban Government agreed that verification be also exercised, on the basis of reciprocity, with respect to Cuba as well, so as to dispel any alleged doubts as regards Cuba's aggressive tendencies.

Mr. Kuznetsov then said that these proposals were of course stated only in principle; they were only an outline or a basis for some future mechanism to be spelled out and formalized. However, upon agreement of the parties, it should not be difficult for U Thant to work out the details of such UN presence in the Caribbean in consultation with the parties concerned.

In summary, Mr. Kuznetsov said, he wished to state that in handing this document the USSR hoped that on this basis agreement could be reached on a final and lasting settlement of the Cuban crisis, normalizing the situation in the Caribbean. The basis for this hope was the fact that the US and the USSR, ^{also} as had ~~been stated~~ ^{also} by some objective people in the US press, were able, when they wanted ~~to reach~~ ^{to reach} quick agreement on important and sometimes complicated and difficult problems. This was also proven by the fact that in the course of the exchange of messages between October 22 and October 27, prompt ^{prevent} measures had been taken to ~~prevent~~ ^{prevent} thermonuclear catastrophe, the ^{breath} ~~horror~~ of which ~~unconsciously~~ could be felt/so near, and a basis had been provided for the solution of the Cuban crisis.

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The USSR believed that, if both sides showed good will and sincere desire for a speedy solution, they ought to be able to present for consideration by the Security Council an agreed document ending this dangerous crisis and giving confidence to the peoples of the world that such a crisis would not recur in the future. The Soviet Delegation was prepared to work on this noble task.

Mr. Kuznetsov then said he wished to touch briefly upon a procedural point. Since the document just handed to Amb. Stevenson had been ~~proposed~~ ^{affected} submitted by two governments and ~~affecting~~ the interests of three governments, then as a matter of principle, since each of those governments was a sovereign one, and also from the practical standpoint so as not to lose too much ~~time~~ ^{extra time} in reaching agreement, the USSR believed it useful to have these meetings ^{take place} among the three parties, i.e., ^{have} tripartite negotiations. ~~Such an arrangement would be in~~ That would be in accord, both in spirit and letter, with the conduct of negotiations on the basis of the UN Charter and also with the practice of some international negotiations in the past. This was the Soviet view on this point, which was being put forward for consideration by the US, ^{on which} and the USSR wished to reach agreement ~~on this matter~~.

Amb. Stevenson said he believed he could be brief in his response. Firstly, we wanted Mr. Kuznetsov to note the protest we had lodged here the other night against any interference with flights of US planes until agreement was reached. ~~Subsequently, we~~ ^{we} wished to remind Mr. Kuznetsov that the US had accepted ship-side inspection of the removal of missiles not because he thought it was as effective as UN observation and supervision set forth in the agreement, but rather to accommodate the USSR. We ~~expected~~ ^{expected} consideration on the part of the Soviet Union with respect to the only means of observation which had now been

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left to us, and not because of any fault of ours/at that.

Amb. Stevenson said we were as eager as the USSR to reach a settlement of the Cuban situation and we were not advancing any new questions beyond those contained in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence. Referring to Mr. Kuznetsov's remark that the US was agreeable to a document or protocol to be agreed between the US and the USSR and presented to the Security Council, he said he was afraid he must correct and remind Mr. Kuznetsov that the US Delegation had said on numerous occasions at these meetings that the US believed that the proper way was to make mutual declarations in the Security Council. Indeed, Mr. Khrushchev's letter referred in several places to such declarations. As to the protocol handed ^{to us} ~~him~~ now and also received ~~from~~ from U Thant earlier, this document was the best evidence of the impossibility to reach any agreement in writing by a protocol of this kind. Furthermore, the US Delegation had reminded the Soviet Delegation repeatedly of the US rejection of all these conditions of Castro. Thus, Amb. Stevenson said, he had to repeat what he had said many times before, namely, that when the USSR had performed its part of the agreement, the US would do two things it was obliged to do under the agreement: (a) lift the quarantine, and (b) make a declaration in the Security Council against invasion of Cuba. As to what the Latin American countries would do, he could only say that the US would propose that the status quo ^{had} prior to October 22, when the trouble/^{had} started, be restored.

Amb. Stevenson recalled that at the last meeting he had asked for Soviet suggestions for compliance with the condition in the President's October 27th letter that the USSR would undertake not to introduce such weapons in the future.

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He thought perhaps Mr. Kuznetsov had some suggestions with respect to such safeguards. He then ^{stated} ~~mentioned~~ that Mr. Kuznetsov had suggested some principles advanced by W. Thant; he was sorry that he did not know what they were and therefore could not comment at this time.

However, Amb. Stevenson continued, the interesting ^{part} ~~in~~ Mr. Kuznetsov's statement was that there was nothing in it about the most important question, namely, removal of ^{the} IL-28 aircraft. He repeated that the US was eager to reach a speedy settlement in the spirit of mutual accommodation, which the US had been demonstrating all along, and expressed the hope that agreement could ^{also} ~~be reached~~ on other questions, beyond the Cuban problem, which ~~were~~ ^{were} so important in the world today. However, Cuba was the most ^{important} / immediate problem and, within it, ~~nothing~~ ^{nothing} was more important than removal of the IL-28 bombers. As to Mr. Kuznetsov's suggestion for tripartite discussions, Amb. Stevenson pointed out that the agreement was between the US and the USSR and ~~therefore~~ he believed the discussions should stay between the US and the USSR, because there was no other party to that agreement.

Mr. Kuznetsov said he had already stated the Soviet view on overflights. The only thing he wished to say now was that the USSR could not agree with the US contention that it had no other way than to fly over Cuba and violate its territorial ~~sovereignty~~. He believed Mr. Stevenson would agree those flights were ~~unacceptable~~, particularly now when, as the US knew, all missiles had been withdrawn and ~~the withdrawal~~ ^{the withdrawal} had been ~~a~~ ^{verified} by U.S. Navy vessels. At any rate, he could only reaffirm ~~the Soviet~~ ^{the Soviet} statement on overflights which had been made at the meeting on November 13.

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Mr. Kuznetsov then expressed concern by about Amb. Stevenson's ^{comments} statement ^{on} ^{-Cuban} ~~concerning the~~ Soviet/draft protocol, and said that if one took a careful look at the provisions in that paper, one would see that they were directed at resolving the problem, liquidating tensions, and creating a normal situation in the Carribean. As he understood, US and Soviet wishes on this latter point coincided. He did not think Amb. Stevenson's effort to attach to the document the label of Castro represented a good or justified approach. Such an approach could be adopted only if one did not wish to be businesslike. The protocol contained nothing which went beyond the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange or Castro's ^{were aimed} letter, which ~~was aimed~~ ^{was aimed} at normalizing the situation.

Mr. Kuznetsov said he was also concerned by Amb. Stevenson's statement advancing a new formula with respect to the states in the Western Hemisphere. The President's letter made no reference to the status quo ante. The USSR had not agreed to some status quo, but had reached agreement ~~to eliminate~~ to eliminate this crisis and create such conditions as would prevent its recurrence in the future, since this crisis could aggravate the situation and threaten the peace. Thus, here one must proceed not on the basis of some new formula, but of the President's letter.

As to Soviet assurances against reintroduction of these weapons in the future, that obligation still stood and the USSR was prepared to cooperate in this respect ^{to} ~~and seek with the US and~~ appropriate formula for such assurances. With regard to ~~guarantees~~, the USSR believed that a UN presence in the Carribean would be of great help. Mr. Stevenson had said he was not aware of the contents of that proposal, but they had been referred to by the Soviet Delegation during previous meetings. The proposal was not complicated; it provided for placing UN teams in

some parts of the Eastern Hemisphere, and the status of such teams could be easily worked out if all parties cooperated with and assisted U Thant in his work on this problem. Mr. Kuznetsov expressed the view that all questions which were still unresolved ^{and} on which the US insisted, ~~such as~~ ^{such as} verification, etc., ~~might~~ ^{might} be resolved if agreement ~~was~~ was reached on this point.

Turning to the question of the IL-28 bombers, Mr. Kuznetsov noted he had stated the Soviet view on this matter at the last meeting and had nothing to add. However, he wished to stress that the US proposal made at the last meeting was not aimed at resolving the Cuban problem as a whole or at developing the obligations of all parties; nor was it aimed at developing guarantees to the Cuban people that they could live in peace or guarantees that no such crisis would recur in the future. In other words, the time had now come when one had to lay the cards on the table and see how to construct the settlement of the problem as a whole. However, the formula suggested by Amb. Stevenson at the last meeting did not lead to this objective and did not help to solve the problem in accordance with the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence. As to the individual points which had to be resolved within the whole problem, they were known to Amb. Stevenson and they were reflected in the draft document. Of course, if one wished to guarantee ~~presumptions~~ ^{it always} ~~one could find~~ ^{find} excuses for endlessly delaying the solution of the Cuban question.

Mr. Anastasiy continued that as far as tripartite discussions were concerned, this idea had been put forward for consideration by the US because the USSR sincerely wished to find a solution reflecting and meeting the interests of all the parties concerned. Furthermore, as Mr. Zorin had just reminded him, the

Security Council had authorized U Thant to bring together the three parties to carry out negotiations under his guidance. It would be best if the three parties could sit together and consider all these issues. Mr. Stevenson would agree that many of the issues directly affected Cuba, involved obligations by Cuba, and could not be resolved without Cuba's ^{voice being} ~~making themselves~~ heard. The USSR believed that such a procedure would be practical and would be appreciated by the Americans who were practical people themselves and knew the value of time.

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Mr. Kuznetsov then said he wished to stress his concern about Amb. Stevenson's statement that the US would comply with its obligations when the USSR had performed its part of the agreement. If one were to follow such an approach, the problem could be endlessly protracted because the US could always claim that the USSR had not performed some of its obligations. He wished to repeat once again that the USSR had already done more than was provided for in the President's October 27 letter. If Mr. Stevenson were to read that letter again, he would see that all that was required was ^{that} ~~that~~ for work to cease on missile installations and that those installations be dismantled; everything else was to take place within the framework of a general settlement. However, the USSR was negotiating honestly and it believed it useful to demonstrate its sincerity. Therefore, it had done much more than was provided for in the President's letter. ~~Further~~ The Soviet Union wished to show its desire to resolve the Cuban problem as soon as possible, and will do to resolve other problems, and here, Mr. Kuznetsov said, ~~therefore~~ he agreed with Mr. Stevenson that other problems should be resolved too. However, if one sought all the time to find some points which allegedly had not been fulfilled by the other side, then no end could be seen to negotiations. He ^{draft} wished to appeal to the US to consider the ~~document~~ submitted today carefully

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and to turn to ~~_____~~ the discussion of a specific document, so that the USSR could see that the US was guided by the same feelings as the USSR.

Amb. Stevenson said he could perhaps accelerate this discussion. Mr. Kuznetsov had raised several points. Mr. Kuznetsov had expressed concern with respect to what the Latin American countries would do and with respect to the status quo before October 22, saying ~~it~~ this was a new formula. Amb. Stevenson said that what he had meant here was that in the US would take the initiative in the OAS and to ask for the repeal of the October 23 resolution adopted by the OAS in authorizing the quarantine and the other measures taken by the US to ensure the removal of ~~_____~~ offensive weapons from Cuba. Once this resolution was repealed, the situation would revert to the status quo before October 22 and all rights and obligations under the Rio Pact would apply, including the obligation with regard to invasion by one state against another. This was no new formula and was consistent with the President's letter. Indeed, it went even further and it showed what the US wanted to do to induce the Latin American countries against invasion of Cuba. As to the question of a US presence in the Caribbean and Mr. Kuznetsov's remark that it would be easy to come to ~~an~~ prompt agreement on the details of such an arrangement, Amb. Stevenson said he was afraid that he could not answer that point; he would have to find out more about it and would be glad to discuss it very soon.

Repeating Mr. Kuznetsov's remark that the US suggestion with regard to the removal of the IL-28 bombers was not based on a desire to resolve the whole problem, Amb. Stevenson wondered whether the draft protocol was based on such a desire, because it contained no reference to the IL-28's. Amb. Stevenson then pointed out that he had repeated again and again that the US did want to resolve

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the whole problem and that it did know what the questions to be solved were. For Mr. Khrushchev's benefit, he could recite them again. In order to resolve the whole problem as soon as possible, the USSR should:

including

1. Remove offensive weapons, i.e., the IL-28's;
2. Give assurances that all nuclear components, warheads and nuclear aerial bombs, had been removed;
3. Provide on-site inspection in Cuba to verify completion of the transaction in accordance with Mr. Khrushchev's letter;
4. Give the US assurances against reintroduction of offensive weapons in the future; and
5. Give the US suggestions for safeguards against reintroduction of such weapons in the future.

As far as the US was concerned, its unfulfilled obligations were:

lift

1. To ~~lift~~ the quarantine;
2. To give Cuba assurances against invasion; and
To seek
3. ~~Seek~~ the cooperation of the Latin American countries with respect to non-invasion.

The US had assumed no other obligation under the agreement ~~in~~ vis-a-vis either the USSR or Cuba. If the Soviet representatives disputed ~~any part of~~ ^{inventory} this ~~kind of~~ obligations, it would help our discussions if individual cases were taken up ~~to the point~~ were disputed.

~~Mr. Khrushchev~~ commented on Mr. Khrushchev's suggestion for tripartite negotiations, saying he could not believe that this proposal had been advanced seriously if the USSR sincerely desired to settle the problem promptly. There was no need for prolongation, and we ^{had} told the USSR on many occasions of our conditions. Now was the time for the USSR to say what it agreed to do on the basis

of this inventory of undertakings.

Mr. Kuznetsov said he agreed that the time had come to express ^{oneself} ~~oneself~~ frankly and completely; the point was, however, that the USSR had already done so, but not the US.

As to the status quo and restoration of the situation existing prior to October 23, Mr. Kuznetsov said he wished to ask the US not to involve the USSR in what it did with other countries in the Western Hemisphere, or in measures the US imposed on Latin American countries or wished to repeal. The US knew that the USSR had never recognized and did not recognize decisions by the OAS. The same applied to the Rio Pact. This was the United States' own business, and the USSR would proceed on the basis of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange. Mr. Kuznetsov said he had already stated what had to be done to resolve this problem, but the US wished to substitute for that its relations with the OAS, although it knew that the USSR did not recognize OAS decisions.

Mr. Kuznetsov then said he took note of Mr. Stevenson's statement that he would consider the question of a UN presence and that he would discuss it after he had studied it. Turning to the situation with respect to the fulfillment of obligations, Mr. Kuznetsov said he wished to stress that any objective person would say that the USSR had fulfilled its obligations but that the situation was different as regards the US. ^{referred to} Amb. Stevenson had mentioned the IL-28's and the fact that they were not mentioned in the draft protocol. The USSR had already stated its views on the IL-28's, but it believed that the ~~given~~ ^{draft} protocol could resolve the problem at hand even without raising the IL-28's. What the USSR had done provided a basis for the settlement of the entire problem.

Mr. Khrushchev's remark about the problem of removal of all nuclear weapons by the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev said he had already discussed this subject, but he wished to repeat what he had said earlier and was authorized to state the following: All warheads for missiles had been removed immediately after the adoption by the USSR of the decision for the dismantling and removal of missile sites, and this had been done before the arrangements for ship-side verification were made. He was also authorized to state firmly that all nuclear weapons had been removed from Cuba. He hoped that this statement was sufficient to dispose of this question. The USSR was making this new step to stress its sincere desire to resolve the whole problem as soon as possible. As to inspection of the weapons removed, the USSR had given the US the opportunity of verifying and ~~the operation of the removal of weapons and had even~~ agreed to a procedure including counting and taking photographs. When the US now said that this obligation had not been fulfilled by the USSR, this created the impression that the US was doing so for its own purpose which had nothing to do with the objective of speeding up ^{agreement} ~~the achievement of an agreement~~. He wished to repeat once again that with regard to on-site inspection in Cuba Mr. Khrushchev's October 27 letter stated that the USSR did not object to such an arrangement but that, of course, such inspection was subject to consent from the Cuban Government. As regards ~~the~~ non-introduction of the weapons withdrawn, the Soviet Government had stated in Mr. Khrushchev's message that it would not reintroduce these weapons. This commitment still stood. As to the guarantees in this respect, it was now the common problem of the US and the USSR to see how the fulfillment of obligations by the parties would be observed and verified. The USSR believed that the proposal which the two sides would have an opportunity

to discuss would provide possibilities in this respect, including assurances for the UN Government that those weapons would not be reintroduced ^{in to} Cuba. Furthermore, since Cuba agreed to have this proposal ^{apply} ~~submitted~~ to its territory as well, apparently possibilities could be found for ~~the~~ a satisfactory solution of this ~~specific~~ question too. If the US had any views on this point, it would be well to hear them so as to know what they were.

Thus, Mr. Kuznetsov continued, as Mr. Stevenson could see the USSR had fulfilled its obligations. But when one looked at how the US had been fulfilling its obligations, one must see a different situation: the quarantine had not been lifted; the overflights continued; an unbridled campaign was being conducted against Cuba in the US press, apparently not without the US Government's knowledge; the US had submitted no proposals as to how it would formulate the obligations relating to guarantees to Cuba and the obligations of Latin American countries, to be presented to the Security Council. In short, the time had come, indeed, to engage in a thorough discussion, but ~~time was passing rapidly~~ now it was for the US to do so. He wished to stress this in all frankness. He wished to ask the US for specific suggestions and also for ^{its} ~~the~~ views on the draft protocol.

Amb. Stevenson said he believed he could answer Mr. Kuznetsov right away. He ^{thought} ~~believed~~ there had been some progress. As he understood, Mr. Kuznetsov had said that (1) the USSR would give assurances that all nuclear weapons had been removed from Cuba; (2) the USSR would give assurances against reintroduction of offensive weapons; (3) some system of a UN presence should be mutually considered as a future safeguard with respect to non-reintroduction of offensive weapons. In response to Mr. Kuznetsov's comment that the assurances under (1) and (2) had already been given, Amb. Stevenson said that he meant assurances within the

declarations to be made in the Security Council. Amb. Stevenson continued that this left open two questions: (1) final on-site verification; while we had heard Mr. Kuznetsov's remarks about ship-side verification of missiles, we gathered no verification was contemplated with respect to a completion of the transaction in Cuba, and thus this question remained open; and (2) removal of the IL-28 bombers. We, therefore, hoped that at the next meeting we would hear proposals by the Soviet Union on these two points, and also that we could discuss a future UN presence. On the US side, when these conditions were fulfilled, the following would have to be undertaken: (1) lift the quarantine, and the US had said that it would lift the quarantine immediately upon oral assurances from the USSR that the IL-28 bombers would be removed within a limited period of time; (2) give substance in a declaration in the Security Council, and we would be glad to submit to the Soviet Delegation a draft of such declaration; and (3) obtain cooperation of the Latin American countries in the OAS; if Mr. Kuznetsov did not like our suggestion for reinstatement of obligations with regard to non-aggression under the Rio Pact, perhaps he could tell us what he would like, bearing in mind not only what he liked but also what we could get from the Latin American countries. Amb. Stevenson said this summarized the outstanding points, both on the Soviet and the US side. He said he wished to repeat that the US was anxious to settle the matter harmoniously and promptly and that he present to the Security Council appropriate declarations. If the USSR would promise to remove the bombers, the quarantine would have been lifted, and that the only declaration the US would have to make would relate to assurances against invasion and to steps it would take to obtain the cooperation of Latin American countries.

Mr. Kuznetsov said that the fact that Amb. Stevenson had said the US would do certain things upon fulfillment of certain conditions by the USSR meant that the US was attempting to make the whole problem contingent upon its understanding of the situation and upon its views on the solution of the problem. However, this approach was one of inequality. He wished to reiterate that we had now reached the stage where a document must be discussed which would embrace all the questions deriving from the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange, but the US wanted to continue the discussions on the basis that the USSR must continue to fulfill one thing after another while the US did not say anything concrete. Such negotiations were not based on the principle of equality. The USSR did not understand such an approach, because it had done so much whereas the US kept saying that the USSR should do one thing after another. The USSR now wished to state clearly, so that there would be no misunderstanding, that the negotiations had now reached the stage where the US should give produce a document about what obligations it was prepared to fulfill and how. The USSR was going to discuss this matter and seek the attainment of this objective. The US should adhere to the October 27 letter of the President and should not impose its views on the USSR. The USSR had gone even further than that letter, and he wished to remind Mr. Stevenson of ^{its} contents. Mr. Kuznetsov then quoted the first two paragraphs of the October 27 letter of the President. He wished to draw Mr. Stevenson's attention to this portion of the letter and to stress that the negotiations should embrace the whole problem and should not deal with individual questions. If the US kept raising individual questions, there would be no assurance that the negotiations would ever end. The Soviet position had already been stated and it was not proper for the US to interpret it its own way. The USSR was conducting serious negotiations

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and it is improper to impose one's own interpretation on the other side.

Mr. Kuznetsov continued that Amb. Stevenson had asked him how the US should deal with the Latin American countries. He wondered why the US wanted to involve in the USSR with this matter. The USSR proceeded from the President's letter. If it were clearly stated, as was ~~was~~ in the draft ~~protocol, although if~~ ^{protocol, although if} that particular language was not satisfactory to the US it could give its own suggestions--that the US and the Latin American countries would not invade Cuba, that, he believed, would correspond to the spirit of the President's letter. The Soviet Union believed that agreement could be quickly arrived at, but for that purpose efforts of at least three parties were required, and particularly the US. He said he would be happy to receive the US declaration ^{or} ~~for~~ any other document.

Amb. Stevenson observed he did not understand what this was all about, but if the USSR wanted a draft document about what the US would say with respect to assurances against invasion, we would be glad to produce such a draft, as indeed we had said two weeks ago. If Mr. Kuznetsov was interested in what we intended to ~~do~~ do with respect to the Latin American countries, we could perhaps give him a paper although we had already said what our intentions were. We could not be more specific ~~at this time~~. As to the language about the lifting of the blockade that would have to be done if the IL-38's were removed, but ^{the lifting} ~~that~~ would have been completed by ^{the} ~~that~~ ^{of the declaration.} Amb. Stevenson said that perhaps he could give Mr. Kuznetsov ~~insights~~ on US assurances to Cuba against invasion perhaps tomorrow. As ~~and~~ ~~from~~ ~~and~~ ~~there~~ ~~after~~, we would be glad to hear any suggestion Mr. Kuznetsov might have concerning the Latin American countries.

Mr. Kuznetsov asserted that the draft protocol contained provisions which in Soviet view should be included in any document. Perhaps those provisions were not complete, in particular with regard to the obligations of the Latin American ~~countries~~

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countries, but the US could fill them in. However the USSR had given the US a document in which a great deal of work had been done and it would like to have the US view management on that document or US suggestions. If these negotiations were to be concluded, then it was obvious that their conclusion should be in the form of a document to be presented to the Security Council. There was nothing here that was hard to understand. He was surprised to hear Mr. Stevenson say he did not know what this was all about. He hoped that this did not mean that we would have to start all over again. The problem before us was not difficult, and if we proceeded to resolve it, then agreement could be reached on the form and the wording. However, all questions must be solved simultaneously and not one by one. Only in such a manner could agreement be reached.

To sum up, Mr. Kuznetsov went on, the USSR had given the US a document containing specific provisions which in Soviet view derived from the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange. The USSR was entitled to expect the other side, if it also believed it necessary to come to a conclusion, to give its views on these proposals so that we could know where we stood. ~~However~~ This was all the more so because the USSR believed that all questions were ^{covered} ~~provided for~~ in that document. However, the US, even without any study of the document, appeared to ignore it, and this did not attest to its desire to resolve the problem.

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~~Mr. Stevenson~~ stated that ~~he~~ ^{we} had studied the document and found it wholly unsatisfactory. ~~The US~~ would give the USSR draft language as for a declaration concerning the lifting of the blockade, assurances against an invasion, and steps to obtain cooperation from Latin America. Mr. Stevenson stressed, however, that no conclusions could ~~be reached~~ take place before the IL-28 bombers were removed and verification of the transaction was worked out. While we would

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be glad to give language for a declaration, perhaps tomorrow, we hoped the USSR would have proposals with respect to the IL-28 bombers and verification.

Mr. Demetsov concluded the conversation by saying that the USSR would wait. He wished to stress for the US document and by ~~stressing~~ once again that it flowed from the President's message that one must not admit something but rather that agreement must be reached on all questions at the same time. Only if such a procedure were adopted one could see where he stood.

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